Zarate's history clearly conveys the intent of Treasury's approach. As such, Treasury's War should be required reading for policy makers. However, with a decade of on-the-ground policy implementation, Treasury's War should be more than a triumphal recitation. Mr. Zarate's assessments of the efficiency, efficacy, coherence and limitations of Treasury's policy would have strengthened the book. The most serious, yet unspoken, limitation of Treasury's approach is that it does not project power. It works by reduction, isolating US finance from designated entities and their associates. The logical endpoint of any such system is US self-isolation, not power projection. Secondly, created and administered by lawyers and prosecutors, Treasury's approach maintains the petite fiction of domestic legality when, in fact, the policy was designed to operate beyond US legal jurisdiction where informal American diplomatic influence has failed. Additionally, much of Treasury's War operates on an administrative basis, not a legal basis. The US government can designate entities administratively and is not required to demonstrate whether target has either specific knowledge or intent beforehand. Regardless of the legal terminology, framework, or perspective of the participants and their talk of pursuing international scofflaws, it is an exercise in US power projection not criminal enforcement. Lastly, the book leaves one Rubicon uncrossed. Treasury's War describes systemic manipulation of the global financial system for US objectives. Systems are dynamic, adaptive, and adopt new equilibria as a result of interventions or shocks; otherwise they do not survive. The balance between specific intervention versus system regulation remains an open question.
The book's last chapter, "The Coming Financial Wars," looks at some emerging challenges to Treasury's war and serves as the basis for Zarate's Parameters article (Winter 2013-14) . The author approaches the finite future of both the dollar as world reserve currency and American as financial hegemon with a touch of melancholy. This approach leaves unanswered the question of how the United States will continue to harness international financial self-interest to its national policy aims. He approaches networked asset creation-companies such as Facebook, Google, and Bitcoin, which create value by their network and network position and not of themselves-as problems to solve not horses to harness. It is a decidedly twentieth century perspective. To give Zarate his due, the epilogue of Treasury's War contains nuanced musings on the role and limits of national power projection through financial means. Those questions and his answers deserve expansion into another book.
Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War By Nicholas A. Lambert
Reviewed by Sarandis Papadopoulos, Ph.D., principal co-author Pentagon 9/11 and Secretariat Historian, Department of the Navy N aval power in the First World War seemingly served only defensive purposes. Fleets protected Entente trade, while German U-boats tried to stifle delivery of supplies. The Dardanelles campaign, the failed naval attempt to bypass deadlock in France and Flanders, sought to buttress Russia with equipment and keep it in the war. During the conflict,
